I stated above “Curious if Incus and TrueNAS have ways to mitigate this in software, as I am researching this, it seems OS providers were able to do so when this first became a concern.”
TrueNAS provided the message and link in the webui, so yes, that is evidence that I feel grants me being able to ask the question.
In my research I found:
" Guidance :
#### No virtualization
The Linux kernel update will fully mitigate the issue.
#### Virtualization with trusted guests
If the guest OS can be trusted and runs an updated kernel, the system is protected against l1tf and needs no further actions.
#### Virtualization with untrusted guests
If SMT is not supported by the processor, or disabled in the BIOS, or by the kernel, only flushing the L1 Datacache is required when switching between VMs.
How to control this via options, is described in the sections above.
If SMT is supported and active, the following scenarios are possible :
** Guests can be confined to single or groups of cores not shared with other guests.*
> While this reduces the attack surface greatly, interrupts or kernel threads could still run on those cores in parallel with malicious code, and data used by those could be exposed to attackers.
** Additionally to isolating guests to single or groups of cores interrupt handling can reduce the attacker surface, but its still possible that kernel threads run on those cores.*
** Only disabling SMT and enabling L1 Datacache flushes provides maximum protection."*
So with a trusted guest, things should be fine. I understand that. I am still curious if Incus or TrueNAS has done anything further, which is possible, to help mitigate this being an issue.